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I. CUSTOMS UNION - EFFECTS, GAINS (LOSSES) 
INTRODUCTION 
There are in essence two approaches to the theory of customs 
unions and the a^islysis varies depending upon the assumption that 
is made as to the nature of the political process. The first 
approach assumes government to be "non-economic" and focuses on the 
economic costs of such activity, which when compared to the non-
economic benefit determines whether or not the customs union benefits 
the community on balance. The second approach assumes that government 
activity is directed towards maximising the economic x̂ relfaxe of the 
community and there is a need to develop optimization procedures in 
support of government objectives. 
Traditionally the former was taken as the point of departure, 
and the analyses concentrated on trying to identify the gains and the 
losses attributable to customs union, separating those which enhance 
from those which lower the total of social welfare.—'^ But more 
recently the theoretical orientation has been away from those welfare 
effects of customs unions, to the more fundamental question of why 
they are formed in the first instance. Such change reflects both a 
theoretical and an i,nstitutional imperative. The former being the 
failure of traditional trade theory to explain why policies other than 
free trade or modified free trade are followed by governments; the 
latter due to the recent interest of developing countries in economic 
integration as a means of accelerating their rate of economic progress. 
For small developing countries entering customs unions, the 
economip considerations as a rule are regarded as attractive; and to 
the extent that there is an economic case for such specially close 
economic ties between the countries, the case is likely to be stronger 
where it rests on specific economic criteria. But in practice the 
essence of thp relationship goes beyond purely economic considerations 
to embrace other aspects of policy. As a consequence customs union 
analysis has more recently come to be based on acceptance of the idea 
Xj This was based on the implicit assumption that "real income" 
is identifiable on social welfare function lines with the utility 
derived by individuals from their personal consumption of goods and 
services. 
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that it is a deliberate use of tariff policy by two or more countries to 
achxeve objectives not attainable through individual action. And related 
to this is the further idea that the customs union approach is attractive 
to countries that individually are unable to affect their terms of trade, 
although they are able to trade at the foreign rate of product transfor-
mation = 
Such considerations focus tariff policy in customs unions as essen-
tially protective mechanisms, which, by the elimination of tariffs within 
the union along with the maintenance of tariffs against countries outside 
the union, enable the partners in the union to develop as sources of 
supply, thereby replacing some imports from countries outside the union» 
TRADE EFFECTS 
Because of the central place of tariffs in customs union arrangements 
and the effects that tariffs have on trade, the theoretical analyses of 
the operations of customs unions invariably stress the trade aspects. The 
general approach is in terms of separating these effects as to whether 
they are "trade creating" or "trade diverting". In the first category are 
put the accretions to trade among the partners, and in the second the 
extent to which the union has resulted in substituting supplies from Inside 
the union for imports from outside the union. In practice the net trade 
result is a combination of these two effects» According to the traditional 
view, if the trade creation is the greater element there is an addition to 
social welfare; and if the trade diversion is the greater there is a re-
2/ duction in social welfare.— 
The question has been considered, whether trade diversion always 
results in lowering of welfare, and it is now accepted that this is not 
necessarily so. The line of argument may be summarised as follows: when 
a customs union is formed some dutiable goods formerly imported from 
outside sources will be replaced by the same goods imported from a partner 
country, duty free but at a higher real cost. The shift to a higher-cost 
source of supply tends to lower the country's real income, and consequently 
consumer welfare; but the tariff reduction also works as removal of a 
constraint on consumption and may raise welfare. If the second effect is 
favourable, and outweighs the first effect, there is a net rise in welfare. 
_2/ It may be noted that this approach leads virtually automatically 
to the conclusion that welfare is maximised under free trade conditions. 
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Ckjnceptually at least there can be new trade creation without 
trade diversion. Such a case would apply to conmodities which one 
of the members will now newly import from a partner (but which it 
did not formerly import at all) because the price of the protected 
domestic product is now lower than the price at any foreign source 
plus the duty. Equally it is in theory possible for a customs 
union to have no new trade-creating effect and only trade-diverting 
effect» as in the case where the common tariff shuts off foreign 
sources of supply, and inside the union existing industries acquire 
a new set of customers in partner countries without undergoing any 
significant change (as would be expected to happen if the industries 
were to meet new competition originating from partner countries). 
As a consequence of the- large attention paid to these trade 
effects, there is strong support for the view that the primary 
purpose of a customs union, and its major consequence, is to shift 
sources of supply. What is more, the shift can be either to lower-
cost or to higher-cost sources depending on the circumstances. 
Where intra-union supplies are substituted for lower-cost foreign 
imports, the shift is to higher-cost sourcesi But account, also has 
to be taken of shifts between the partners. In this case a customs 
union is-said to increase welfare to the extent that it creates 
trade'ty diverting demand.from high-cost domestic to lower-cost 
partners' products; and decreases welfare to the extent that it 
diverts trade from lower-cost foreign to higher-cost partner sources. 
This approach of course emphasises the trade aspect, without taking 
account of inter-commodity substitution, changes in the terms of trade, 
and other effects of the customs union arrangements.. 
The; traditional postulation that trade diversion .invariably 
reduces welfare has been further modified by the recognition that 
there is a welfare increasing effect where the trade diversion results 
3/ 
also In inter-commodity substitution.— Further, where there is 
variability 6f production, diversion of trade can result in welfare 
V The welfare increasing effect is maximised when the rate of 
substitution in consumption equates the product transformation rate. 
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gains» not only in the partner countries, but also In the "home" country. 
The results of such analyses have been to demonstrate how indeterminate 
the trade effects can be, the outcome depending on the circumstances of 
the countries in the union. 
A further aspect to take account of is that when a customs union 
operates more to divert trade from its previous channels, rather than to 
create new trade, the internal removal of duties operates to increase the 
protective effect (for high-cost producers) of the duties which remain. 
This is a consequence achieved not by reducing imports into cheir own 
national territory, but by extending the operation of the protective duty 
in their favour to the territories of the partner countries in the customs 
union. 
If therefore one sums up the orthodox view o£ customs union the 
general line of economic reasoning would run. When a customs union is 
formed, the tariff is taken off imports from the partner countries and the 
relative price between these goods and domestic goods is brought into 
conformity with the real rates of transformation. This by itself tends to 
increase welfare. But on the other hand, the relative price between 
imports from.union partners and imports from the outside world are moved 
away from equality with real rates of transformation. This by itself 
tends to reduce welfare. The shift to imports from union partners therefore 
involves both a gain and a loss. But what most matters is the relation 
between imports from the outside world and expenditure on domestic commodi-
ties. The larger the purchases of domestic commodities and the smaller are 
the purchases from the outside world, the more likely it is that the union 
will brî ig gain. 
This welfare argument gives rise to two general conclusions - first 
that given a country's volume of international trade, a customs union is 
more likely to raise welfare the higher the proportion of trade with the 
country's union partners, and the lower the proportion with the outside 
world. The second is that a customs union is more likely to raise welfare 
the lower is the total volume of foreign trade; for the lower the level 
of foreign trade, the lower must be purchases from the outside world 
relative to purchases of domestic commodities. This means that the sort 
of countries who ought to form customs unions are those doing a high 
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proportion of their foreign trade with their union partners, and 
making a high proportion of their total ^xpenditure on domestic 
trade. Countries which are likely to lose from a customs union, 
on the other hand, are those countries in which a low proportion 
of total trade is domestic, especially if the customs union does 
not include a high proportion of their foreign trade. 
SOME THEORETICAL LIMITATIONS 
It would be gathered from the foregoing that most of the 
enquiries into customs union had been confined mainly to studying 
the effects of customs unions on welfare, rather than for example, 
on the level of economic activity, the balance of payments, or 
the rate of inflation. This aspect assumes importance when it is 
recognized that gains and losses may arise from a number of 
different sources: 
(i) new trade creation and/or trade diversion; 
(ii) specialization of production due to comparative 
advantages; 
(iii) economies of scale; 
(iv) changes in the terms of trade; 
(v) forced changes in efficiency due to increased 
competition; 
(vi) changes in the rates of economic growth. 
However the theory of customs unions has been almost completely 
confined to an investigation of (i) and (ii) above, with some 
sight attention to (iii) and (iv). The item (vi) has not been 
dealt with at all, while (v) is ruled out of the traditional 
theory by the assumption (often contradicted by the facts) that 
production is carried out by processes which are technically 
efficient. 
The problem revolves round the difficulty of defining the 
other effects of customs union operations as additional to trade 
creation and trade diversion, rather than as component parts of 
the trade effects. For example, when there is initial production 
in several partners, and the union allows one or two to capture 
the entire union market, the replacement of higher-cost partner production 
with lower-cost domestic production on the one hand, and the reduction in 
the cost of production of domestic goods on the other, are both integral 
parts of the same phenomenon. Nevertheless it is useful to consider the 
separate elements and the conditions in which they contribute to gains and 
losses, even while recognizing that the possible gains from a customs union 
resulting from improvements in the terms of trade, economies of scale, and 
reductions in disguised unemplo3mient, do not show up as readily as the 
trade gains. 
On this question of the economic benefits arising from other causes, 
e.g. economies of scale, or through forced efficiency, there have not been 
as comprehensive enquiries as for trade effects. Some analytical advances 
have however been made and some situations identified. For example, on 
economies of scale, it is fairly evident that if the market is expanding 
all the firms in a given industry could grow and economies of scale could 
be realised, but if the market is static then growth can be achieved only 
at the expense of competitors. ^However a distinction has to be drawn 
between the costs of production proper, and the costs of selling - for if 
the cost of selling is rising faster than cost of production is falling, 
then there is not likely to be expansion, and economies of scale would 
not be realised_^/ 
Similarly as regards possible gains through forced efficiency, the 
thesis is that firms which may not be adopting methods known to be 
technically more efficient, when thrown into competition with firms in 
partner countries, will be forced to adopt more technically efficient 
methods — and thereby the efficiency in the use of resources may increase, 
(and could turn out to be a significant source of gain). 
SCALE OF PRODUCTION 
The assumption is often made that so far as customs unions have 
effects on trade they are mainly limited to trade creation and trade 
diversion, even where these effects are redefined to include both a pro-
duction and a consumption component. This of course holds true for 
industries and firms where the money costs of production, per unit of 
output, is increasing over the long run relative to the economy as a 
whole. But there are firms and industries where the reverse is true and 
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unit costs decrease as output expands. In this latter category 
falls the situation where a small country by itself may be unable 
to reach a scale of production large enough to make low unit cost 
of production possible, but two or more such countries combined 
may provide a market large enough to make low unit cost production 
possible. 
However, it does not seem probable that the prospects of 
reduction in unit costs of production (as the result of enlarge-
ment of the tariff area) are ordinarily substantial even when the 
individual member countries are quite small in economic size; foi: 
it is the supply conditions of factors of production which are tha 
relevant restrictive factor on expansion of output if it is to be 
achieved without increase of unit costs. Unless the customs union 
operates so as to appreciably increase the inter-member mobility 
of factors of production, it does not in this sense increase the 
"scale" of the economy from the point of view of production 
conditions, even if it does increase it from the point of view of 
the size of the protected market for sales. 
TERMS OF TRADE 
There is, theoretically at least, a possibility of economic 
benefit from tariffs which countries may be able to exploit more 
effectively combined in a customs union, than if they operate as 
separate tariff areas. A customs union by increasing the extent 
of the territory which operates under a single tariff, tends to 
increase the effect of the tariff as a means of improving the 
terms of trade of that area vis-k-vis the rest of the world. This 
derives from the recognition that if a country is large enough to 
affect the terms at which its trade takes place, the imposition of 
a tariff improves its terms of trade. 
Another consideration is that a tariff does not merely divert 
consumption from imported to domestically produced commodities, 
but it also alters, in favour of the tariff-levying country, the 
rate at which it exports exchange for the imports which survive 
the tariff. In short it works in the direction of improving the 
terms of trade. Any improvement in the terms of trade for the 
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country» carries with it an increase to the country in the total benefit 
from trade, The greater the economic area of the tariff levying unit, the 
greater is likely to be (other things being equal) the improvement in its 
terms of trade with the outside world, resulting from its tariff. 
A further aspect is that a customs union by bringing more centraliza-
tion of tariff levying authority, facilitates the development of a more 
effective tariff bargaining policy. This aspect can be important for 
small countries which are at a serious disadvantage in commercial relations 
with large ones. The larger the bargaining unit the more effective its 
bargaining can be; and the effectiveness is further heightened by the 
extent to which commercial policy can be managed under a centralised 
control. This consideration has been an important element in fostering 
aspirations on the part of small countries for customs union. But it has 
to be borne in mind that where the area is too small to influence the 
external prices, it abstracts from the terms of trade effects, and they 
are not likely to be realized. 
ADMINISTRATIVE ECONOMIES 
Finally, more practical than theoretical, are the gains that may he 
made through administrative economies. 
There are broadly two types of savings that can be achieved; 
(a) reductions in the costs involved for exporters and importers 
in meeting the customs requirements, (due to having one set of require-
ments in the place of several sets of requirements); and 
(b) reduction in the costs involved in tariff levying and in 
administering the customs machinery (due to the reduction in the propor-
tion and volume of imports requiring customs inspection and clearance). 
In addition however, if a customs union were "complete" or "perfect" 
so that the tariff walls are removed between its members, aside from the 
removal of the duties themselves, there is a reduction of administrative 
expense to the governments due to the frontiers between them no longer 
having to be watched for customs purposes. Given the economic area of 
the customs union, the larger number of tariff frontiers eliminated, the 
greater the administrative economies (per unit volume of trade). 
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A customs union however, even if "complete", results in the 
full elimination for administrative purposes of tariff frontiers, 
only if and to the extent that the territories are contiguous. 
The existence between the territories of "high seas" is sufficient 
to cut down the administrative economies of customs union. Unless 
the territories comprising the customs union are contiguous, the 
customs union arrangement cannot make any significant contribution 
to the reduction of costs incurred in administering tariff frontiers. 
Further, it has to be recognised that the administrative 
changes would not all involve economies. To the extent that there 
are additional burdens of negotiation, the need to maintain a 
machinery for the co-ordination of customs administration codes, 
provisions for mutual supervision where this is deemed aeslrable, or 
machinery for the settlement of disputes, there would be reductions 
in the net benefits that might be gained. It also follows, if there 
are no substantial gains from reduction of customs inspections and 
trade frontiers administration, and there are added costs attributable 
to co-ordination requirements, that there could be an economic loss 
deriving from higher cost of administration. 
II. BASES AND APPLICABILITY 
GENERAL SITUATION 
The package of analytical conclusions reviewed in the first 
section rests on a range of assumptions, different ones of which 
are employed for the purpose of analysing particular aspects of 
customs union operations. These various assumptions may be listed 
as: (there being) 
lo static conditions in that the working force, the 
capital stock and the technology, are treated as given; 
2. maximum of competition among the economic agents/firms; 
3. factors of production that are homogenous and easily 
substitutable; 
4. no internal or external dis-economies; 
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5o .no uncertainty, with perfect foresight and 
access to raw materials and inputs; 
6c free access to the full range of technologies 
throughout the union; 
7, complete information for producers about the 
market and for consumers about the products; 
8. perfect intza-national factor movements but no 
inter-country movements (e.g= direct investments); 
9o no new gooda produced; 
10, nc governmant interference in the economies, except 
at the customs herder, and only 'with tariffs. 
Such asavimptions are useful for simplifying the analyses, but 
because some of them may not obtain in actual situations, the various 
effects and their likely magnitude seldom emerge in the particular way 
one might expecc» Most important, the often stated prime objective of 
achieving increase in the rate of growth cannot be articulated in the 
static framework. For example, to explain an increase in the rate of 
growth through exploiting technical economies of scale, presupposes 
some increased investment in physical capital even if the products are 
relatively standardised and there are plants operating below the 
minimum efficient scale» In this example, clearly economic growth 
hinges on the correspondence between the rate of growth of manufacturing 
output and that of overall productivity, 
Similarlyj the theoretical concepts of trade creation and diversion 
which depend totally on cost assumptions, in fact can be due to changes 
in efficiency in the resources used up in production. The efficiency 
effects have their counterpart in changes in trade flows; but there is 
nothing like a one-to-one relationship. Dependent on the underlying cost 
situation, the net efficiency gain could be negative while the net effect 
on trade flm^s cculd be positive. 
Several of the ten assumptions would not apply to a wide range of 
ECCM production situations, especially the last, in view of the need for 
governments to influence the type and speed of development. In general 
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the analytical package is helpful when it is applied to fairly 
standardized products, where there is perhaps workable competitions 
where the technologies being applied are widely known in the area, 
and so on. But despite such deficiencies, those a priori analyses 
do help to demonstrate, within limits, how customs union operations 
result in a range of consequences, and what they are likely to be. 
It has to be borne in mind too, that much of customs unions 
theory has expanded along with emergence of the European Economic 
Community, and much of it is influenced by characteristics in the 
developed countries. This explains the focus on the consequences 
for trade and on the allocative effects to industry. Some attempt 
has been made to develop a theoretical frame for developing 
councries; but even here, aside from the gains that could be derived, 
from the protective effects, little is really known of how customs 
unions enhance under-developed countries. 
There still is no conceptual frame that might project the 
consequences where there is economic growth in some but not In other 
partner countries. It might be assumed that under some circumstances 
the growth process in a customs union might be favourably interactive, 
growth in one country stimulating growth in partner countries. But 
it is equally probable there could be conditions that result in 
polanisation with some partners benefiting to the exclusion of others. 
What the range of underlying conditions might be and how they interact 
is still a subject for enquiry. Equally unknown is the manner in 
which the balance of payments may develop as between partners and as 
against third countries, as a result of the distributive effects of 
the union, under varying conditions. 
Perhaps the best case for customs union in developing countries 
may be stated in this fashion. Considering that in each member 
country there are economic activities of varying efficiency, some 
of which produce for export and others of which must be protected 
if the country is to obtain its optimal total amount of domestic 
production, a customs union can operate.as a maximising strategy for 
the governments acting together. Under the most favourable circum-
stances each country can offer its partner an increase in exports and 
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production without suffering a loss of its own; thereby inducing a re-
allocation of domestic resources from the less-efficient import-competing 
sector to the more efficient export sector so as to benefit from compara-
tive advantages. Clearly in this situation there would be gains to the 
separate units, and all-round gain to the customs union. 
But such a rounded situation would be unusual, and cne is left to 
judge the effects on each of the members in terms of the allocation of 
beiicfits deriving from the union in less than perfect conditions. Such 
arguments, moreover^ minimizes the problems encountered by develcping 
countries in the process qf industrialization. It seems implxcit that 
the Industries would already have to exist for ths countries to capture 
the gains that depend on the development of specialization. Further it 
would imply that any item produced in the union would be produced in the 
low-cost country^ and also that the lowest cost industries would be able 
to operate at the total union level of output. By this means each member 
gains by specializing on that produpt in which it has an intra-unxon 
comparative advantage. 
CONSIDERING THE ECCM 
Inadequate basic data makes the attempt to fit the ECCM customs union 
operations into any such set of analytical inter-relationshlps more 
intuitive than empirical. And it is relevant that the concepts and 
methodology for analysis turn largely on industrial production and its 
locus, an area of economic activity still nacient in the ECCM. 
Further, to consider the ECCM customs union operations in the light of 
such analyses, it is Important to take account that the customs union 
elements in the ECCM Agreement weire supplemented by a wide range of policy 
integration provisions. That is, in addition to the abolition of restric-
tions in intra-group trade flows, the jointly agreed national abolition of 
discriminatory measui;-es, and the steps to unify trade policy toward third 
countries, there are positive decisions to stimulate intra-group flows of 
capital, technology, and to a more limited extent labour. Included in this 
are the nucleus for a common competition policy in the provisions concerning 
"export drawback" and "dumped and subsidised imports" (Articles 9 and 10 of 
the ECCM Agreement) supplemented by the provisions for instituting a common 
-13-
4/ industrial policy (Article 13).-
But perhaps even more important for the customs union operations 
is the high degree of unification in monetary aspects achievable 
through having in place a common currency (legal tender) and a common 
Central Bank with a common reserve policy. This eliminates problems 
or exchange rates movements and related monetary adjustments in intta-
union relations. 
Now taking account of the ECCM customs area to identify the 
probable economic effects, gains and losses, the key characteristi:;s 
may be summarised as follows. Consisting ot eeven lóland "erritci 
of varying sizes, with a total market of just over half a million 
persons, primary dependence is on agriculture and tourism. Light 
manufacturing Industry which is generally at a low stage of develop-
ment ̂  more established in some islands than in othersj is in the main 
agro-industrial with a few assembly type plants, several being of the 
enclave type. Only a small proportion of the total trade is accounted 
for by transactions with partners, due very largely to the goods that 
are in wide demand not being produced by the countries in the group. 
Immediately it is evident that the potential for the creation of 
new trade, or the diversion of trade to ECCM sources, is limited - the 
partners being poor sources of supplies for the goods imported from 
abroad. In fact the scope for significant trade effects depends not 
so much on adjustments in the level of output of existing economic 
units, as on the expansion into additional production activities. A 
second aspect is that to the extent there can be trade effects, it 
is likely to be a diversion from lower-cost external suppliers to higher-
cost area suppliers. There would be some possibilities for shifts from 
higher-cost home suppliers to lower-cost partner suppliers, but the scope 
for this is limited by the narrow range of products, and the relatively 
The initiatives do not go so far as to include some elements 
that might reasonably be expected in a complete common market such as 
common business law to overcome disparities in national legislation, 
harmonization of legislation affecting labour (including social benefits 
etc.), or a common regional policy to overcome any induced imbalances 
(which could incorporate a common fund). 
low levels of cutput low In irelation to detaand fequiremente). In ' 
addition account has to be taken of the limitations imposed by apparently 
inadequate inter-ialand transportation and the relatively undeveloped 
piarketlng mechanisms <, • So altogether significant gains from trade cannot 
be expected in the ehcrt termj at least not until expansions in output • 
bave been achiê 'td-- • . - • • , 
Theie is the- tr-at ujhhíí gdnr- ec-Jld be derived from larger 
eized écoa&ató.c units established to serve .the whole, market area, (as,-
opposed to SBialier unit sizes in each of the partner, countries). The 
scope tor such gairiE ¿rom economies of scale would however be modest, .to , 
the extent that there is restricted mobility of production factors; .that 
is, the greater the mobilicy of factors,, the greater the potential for 
gain. In addition, the potential for gain would be greater to the extent 
that the economic units are of a size to meet area demand and in addition 
supply exports for external markets. ^ 
Clearly location of production is important as the magnitude of the 
^ins would depend on the scope for taking advantages of low factor costs. 
Where the economic activity is resource-oriented, production would be 
located where the. resources are; but to. a.: large, extent, production, 
particularly manufacturing activity, depends, on inputs.:.imported froiri;, j ,. ; 
external sources; andMn such cases- tbe-gains would-.derive from,efficiencies 
through taking.advantage of-the best composition of vproduction facilities.. 
This in turn';would' mean that prüjducts using.: r,.elat̂ îvely;-Mgher ,capital,.,.and 
relatively lower labour , inputs should, gravifcatfe ,tO;. lowe.r-cost cap.ltal._. ;,> . , 
sites, while products requiring a. large, labour input gr.ayitat.̂  .t.o relatively 
lower-cost labour areas.. The general proposition would.,b.e that the,greater 
the extent to which activities can be located. In least cost, areas,,, the higher 
the gains are likely; to bev - An important,qualifying: factor: is the extent 
to which there might' be tendencies towards equalising!labour rates, labour 
p.i:oductivity and government "subsidies" to production units. 
Taking'account of [tta civndit iiini Hi '£n£Gr~islsnd;-tran^jorf-; 'the gains 
from location would' -also- .be affected bj?.. .the bulk.,and, unit¿, price, .ofi the,, 
products. To the extent thai they aré bulky and dt low unit value'there 
are advantages to be gained from laCating, the, actly.ity¡.-close to the larger 
groups of consumers, which has the added advantage of facilitating the 
gearing of product lines to localised demand, where this is of importance. 
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As regards the possibility of gains from terms of trade effects;, 
there is not the prospect that much can be realized as the result of 
the common external tariff itself. This is attributable to two facts 
first the low level of the tariff, and second that the market area is 
too small to influence external prices. However, the facility for 
collective bargaining should improve the transactions-relationship of 
the ECCM territories, as against external trading partners. 
On the question of gains deriving from economies in the adminis-
tration of the unified customs area, the geographical disposition of 
the countries nullify the possibility of there being very substancial 
gains from the reduction in the number of customs frontiers. However 
some modest gains may be possible from the reduction of Inspection and 
clearances on area trade - the greater the reduction the greater the 
gains. This however has to be offset by increased costs of administra-
tion attributable to co-ordination of customs operations throughout 
the area. A preferential arrangement between countries not contiguous 
to each other, whether or not they are in the same region, cannot make 
any significant contribution to the reduction of the administrative 
costs of tariff barriers. 
Up to this point the treatment hqs been primarily to review the 
customs union as a whole - which leaves open the question of effects 
gains and losses in respect of the individual territories. An 
important aspect, and one of the ECCM objectives, is to achieve a fair 
distribution in the allocation of benefits derived from the common 
market. Determination of actual benefits attributable to the common 
market is in itself a specific empirical exercise, that lay outside 
the scope of this paper. It is immediately worth noting however, that 
attempts to measure the possible effects of customs union have been 
limited mainly to establishing the possible gains from new trade and 
the possible gains from specialization.—^ 
V Concerning the possible gains from new trade, the general 
conclusion is that the gain would approximate to the increased 
quantity of trade multiplied by the proportion of the purchase price 
made up of tariff. Regarding gains from specialization, such estimates 
as have been made show small changes of the order of less than 1 
percent of national Income. 
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It is of some Importance that gains and losses are not seen entirely 
in the perspective that the relative increase in trade which each of the 
units secure with each other is a measure (from the standpoint of the 
individual territories) of the success or failure of the operations, 
considered within the wider setting of the common market. In fact, bear-
ing in mind that factor movements and commodity movements are partial 
substitutes for each other, the issue turns on utilising the real poss-
ibilities that are opened up to institute wider dimensions of co-operation. 
Much- of this is provided for in the aspects that go beyond customs union 
per se. 
But at the same time, it has to be borne in mind that the nature or 
the economies is important in the degree of success that can initially be 
achieved in a customs union. Where there is the absence of important 
industries operating under tariff protectioi;i, high similarity of major 
export products, the absence of any important basis for the development 
of tüatíe between the partners (whether in high-cost or low-cost products), 
the likelihood is that Initially the union may have only moderate 
significance for its members, and minor significance for the external 
trading partners, regardless of its terms. However, it is generally 
expected that in a common market with mobility of production factors there 
would be in the medium term movements of capital and labour; and in the 
long term relocation of industry to gain the benefits frqm comparative 
advantages. 


